negligence (such as non-persons who were
Hollywood stunt people, who didn't wear their
seat-belts, or who botchErl their suicide
attempts).
This doesn't bother Wreen.
In

IF AT ALL
HUMANLY POSSIBLE

response to my having pointed out that "at
most Wreen has made a case for the ascription
of basic rights to those human non-persons
whose condition is no fault of their own" (p.
126). (The first two words are ernmasizErl
because they were inadvertently omitted from
Wreen's quotation in his response.)
Wreen
replies that it would be consistent with his
position to hold that such non-persons have
forfeited their right to life (WII: p. 26-7).
I continue to find this counter-intuitive,
but the reader must check his/her own intuitions on this point.

MICHAEL WREEN

Marquette University

lImong the many ways in which human
beings differ from animals, two are especially evident in philosomic debate.
I'm not
talking about rationality here; the rather
hard to understand objections of a few aside,
rationality is so evident as not to merit
mention.
No, I'm referring, first, to the
inability of a milosomer to entertain a
doubt that anything he/she ever wrote is or
could be wrong, and, second, his/her willingness to defend unto the death, in the form of
replies and counter-replies, every single
word he/she's ever cOllIllitted to the page.
Evelyn Pluhar and I, I am afraid, are very
much cases in point.
Here we are, going at
it again, this being the second journal and
the fifth article in the series.
Maybe, i f
we're lucky, we can sell the whole thing as a
television serial.

11. In this context, Wreen also claims
that such terms "are used metamorically by
all those who reject (88) [Singer's "speciesism"] and (FS) and, in fact, by everyone who
employs the concept of a basic right at all"
(WI: p. 57). However, (1) Why must a proponent of basic rights personify change or natural law?
Only moral agents are capable of
respecting or violating basic rights.
(2)
Rejectors of speciesism who endorse the notion of basic rights also have no need thus
to personify nature.
In reiterating his
"you, too" charge in "My Kind of Person, "
Wreen actually makes a very different charge:
he claims that anti-speciesists who accord
moral considerability to non-humans anthropomorphize these non-humans. Why? By applying
terms (moral and psychological) for which the
adult human is the m:x:l.el to those who are
non-human.
In doing this, anti-speciesists
use the terms in a "metamorical" or "derivative" sense (WII: n. 6).
In response, I
first want to point out that this would be a
very different sort of metamorizing from
that which Wreen has been chargErl with doing.
Second, to say that any application of psychological or moral terms to non-humans is
anthrofXXllOrfhism is to say that it is cognitively unjustifiErl.
But why should one accept this allegation?
Even if "Wittgenstein
has taught us" that the adult human is the
model for all psychological and moral ascriptions (I happen to be one of those fhiloso. mers who have not been "taught" this by
anybody, including Wittgenstein), it does not
follow that the application of such terms to
others is cognitively unjustified or metamorical.
8uppose that I learn the concept
of box on the basis of my exposure to cigar
boxes. Do I "cigarboximorphize" if, later in
life, I classify music boxes as boxes?
Is
this a cognitively unjustified ascription?

But let me get down to business now,
an effort to keep round five as short
possible.

in
as

The story so far has been:
I write "In
Defense of 8peciesism," [1] arguing that all
creatures belonging to a species characterized by personhood have a right to life-basically, all human beings have a right to
life~
Pluhar responds in "Speciesism Not
Justified, " [2 ] arguing that my arcJument is
defective on many counts; I reply in "My Kind
of Person, " [ 3 ] arguing that Pluhar' s criticisms won't do; Pluhar does not take this
lying down but responds yet again in· "Speciesism Revisited, "[4] defending her earlier
objections against my counter-arguments.

this

That brings us up to the present.
paper, I won't be recapitUlating

In
any
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189

BEIWEEN THE SPECIES

--involves no crlteriological principles at
all, and certainly not (IP). ( IP ), then, is,
my claim and argument to the contrary notwithstanding, not presupposed by (Rr).

more of the blow-by-blow story of rounds one
through four than necessary.
(All of the
recapitulation needed to orient the reader
can be found in "My Kind of Person" and
"Speciesisrn
Revisited.")
In replying to
Pluhar's latest, then, I'll try to be brief
and, as I did in "My Kind of Person," skip
over lots of minor objections.
I

Pluhar

continues to try to rough up

my

identification principle:
(IP) : It is a necessary truth that
the statement "X is a human being"
is g<Xld evidence for the statement
"X is a hum3Il person."
This won't do. The mere fact thac: Feinberg's list of properties characteristic of
personh<Xld contains no criteriological principles doesn't show that none links humanity
and personhood or that none was involved in
attributing personhood to Mr. Weber or that
anyone who accepts Feinberg's characterization must think that the determination of
personhood is "a purely empirical matter,"
i.e., involves no criteriological principles.
To illustrate the point here with an analogous case, let's take pain--to pull one characteristic off Feinberg's list itself--is
definable, and not just characterizable, as
that ouch, or ouch-like, sensation. Still,
the attribution of pain may be, in fact probably is, criteriologically connected to pain
behavior.
The same holds, I would say, with
personhood and hurranity.
The point here, in
short, is that the mere fact that a definition or characterization of a concept is in
tenTIS of properties x, y, and z does not show
that the concept is not criteriologically
connected to sane other concept.
Thus, the
rrove fran "this is how personh<Xld is correctly characterized (or defined)" to "the determination of personh<Xld is a purely empirical
matter" is a move that cannot be automatically made.
Certainly, it looks as if it
shouldn't be made at all, as one of the
characteristics on Feinberg's list, a psychological one, namely pain, is criteriologically related to sanething else, a characteristic not on his list, namely pain behavior,
and all of the characteristics on his list
are psychological ones.
But even if this
particular strong objection is not pressed
against Pluhar, she does make just the inferential move in question, and does so without
any justification at all, in her story about
accepting (RI) but not (IP).
To do so is

I said in "In Defense of Speciesisrn" that
(IP) was plausible but, because of space
limitations, offered as a defense of it only
that it is related to another extremely plausible principle, a reidentification principle:
It is a necessary truth that
identity is g<Xld evidence
for personal identity.
(RI):

bodily

Pluhar still doesn't think (IP) is so related, or that, even if it were, it's at all
plausible.
Let me take these charges in

turn.
Charge one:
Pluhar claims that it's
possible to hold (RI) without holding (IP)
because, she says, it's possible to conceive
of detennining who or what is a person on
purely empirical--that is, non-criteriological--grounds.
She notes that, after all, I
accept Feinberg's notion of personh<Xld (actually, I don't, but that's another story i I
merely gestured in Feinberg's direction in a
friendly way in "In Defense of Speciesisrn" in
order to simplify matters), and on that concept of personhood, who is a person is a
purely empirical matter.
For the sake of
argument, then, let's say that we've determined on purely empirical grounds that this
prrticular hurran being, Walter Weber, is a
person.
Now that Weber has been determined
to be a person, she continues, "we may hold
that the relationship between [Walter Weber]
and this particular body is not purely empirical," and so accept (RI). That is to accept
(RI) without accepting (IP), since, in the
story told, the determination of personh<Xld
in general --and Walter Weber's in particular
BE'IWEEN THE SPOCIES
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simply to beg the question at issue, since it
is to assume without argument that the concept of a human being is not criteriologically connected to that of a person.

is a necessary truth that being a live human
being is sufficient empirical evidence for
being a human person is false.
I find Pluhar's response to this puzzling.
She says that "Wreen responds by
agreeing that we can imagine the evidential
relationship not to hold but denying that
this shows (IP) false." That is simply not
so.
I do deny that anything I said shows
(IP) false, but nowhere do I claim that I can
imagine cases in which the evidential relationship (IP) speaks of doesn't obtain. Certainly none is provided by me, nor do I
anywhere say they are in the offing.
All I
say is that worlds in which all, or alrrost
all, human beings are not persons are conceivable.
That doesn't show that being a
live human being is not good evidence for
being a human person in those worlds, only
that such evidence as it does provide isn't
sufficient to carry the day.

But, that objection also aside, I have
trouble with holding that the relation between this particular person (Walter Weber)
and this particular body is not purely empirical, after detennining that Walter is a
person on purely empirical grounds.
The
temporal "after" can't be taken at face value
here; it must be true from the start that
there is some sort of necessary connection
between the person and his/her (human, we're
assuming) body over time--but, to complete
the story, none at anyone time!
That
doesn't sound coherent to me.
If the diachronic identity of a person is conceptually
caught up with the existence of his/her body,
his/her synchronic identity must be as well.
It would be rrore than odd otherwise, since
the diachronic is simply the
synchronic
stretched out, so to speak.

Continuing her attack,
remark:

Pluhar quotes my

II

All inductive principles, even the
best of them, and even criteriological principles, may have to give
way in particular circumstances in
the face of evidence to the contrary ("My Kind of Person," p. 25),

But even i f (IP) is presupposed by (RI),
so much the worse for (RT), thinks Pluhar.
Why?
Because (IP) is itself false, or at
least highly implausible. In "Speciesism Not
Justified," she says that "it is easy enough
to imagine a world in which 'X is alive
human being' is not good evidence for 'X is a
human person'" (p. 123), and I cormnented that
I supposed

and--I think that this is what she is doing,
anyway--tries to convict me of inconsistency.
She says that the remark won't do because:

that what she has in mind • • • are
worlds in which all, or at least
many of the human beings born in it
are brain damaged, or retarded, or
suffer some mental failing that
precludes personhood• • • • Arguing
by inductive enumeration in such a
world, Pluhar would say (I'm suptosing) "X is a live human being"
dOes not inductively warrant "X is
a human person" ("My Kind of Person," p. 24-25).

it is part of the concept of criterion that i f x is criteriologically related to y, there is no
evidence that would count as showing that x is not good evidenc'i'! for
y.
This is what distinguishes a
criteriological claim from an empirical one.
She's surely right about that.
Hence, given
the quoted remark fran "My Kind of Person," I
am inconsistent, or, better still, should
just say that human bodies and persons are
not related criteriologically.

True enough, I said in reply, but not to the
point, for all such considerations really
show is that the evidential weight that (IP)
speaks of is simply overridden in such cases,
that the conclusion that X is a human person
cannot be drawn straightaway.
That doesn't
show that the evidential weight isn't there
at all or that (IP) is false.
What it does
show is that the (bizarre) principle that it

No doubt I'm at least partly responsible
for the misunderstanding here, given the
wording of that quoted remark.
Still, its
sense is clear enough in context, and the
position taken anything but inconsistent.
For, when I write that all inductive principles, and even criteriological ones, may have
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to give way in particular circumstances in
the face of evidence to the contrary, it is
evident that what is being said is that the
inductive principle enshrined in a criteriological principle--whether mine or one about

unwanted terms is to read "In Defense of
Speciesisrn" without them or to read "My Kind
of Person" as it stands with the claim that
the conclusion of my original argument itself
is laden with such terms and that since the
conclusion of that argument is repeated in
"My Kind of Person," the same holds for it.
The personifying I indulge in is, supposedly,
thereby shown to be inextirpable.

the relation of pain behavior to pain or
whatever--is what gives way, with "gives way"
being understood in the sense that the presence of the first property (e.g., pain behavior) is not sufficient for an attribution of
the presence of the second property (e.g.,
pain). This is to say only that the relation
is not one of inductive sufficiency, even if
it is one of good evidence.
Think of what I
say in relation to a criteriological principIe relating pain behavior and pain, if no
other example comes immediately to mind.
Worlds in which everyone who is in pain acts
stoically and everyone who exhibits pain
behavior is faking it don't show that "it is
a necessary truth that 'x exhibits pain behavior' is good evidence for 'X is in pain'" is
false.
Thus, I certainly agree with Shoemaker's remark, quoted by Pluhar against me,
that

This can't be right as it stands.
The
conclusion of my argument is that all members
of a species characterized by personhood have
a right to life, and no personifying term
occurs in that statement.
What Pluhar means
is that the fourth stage of my argument,
especially as encapsulated, without explanation, in the abbreviated s1..1I!mary of that
stage, includes at least one personifying
term.
That it does, namely in the pu-ase
"equality of opportunity:"
(4) Human non-persons, then, should
be ascribed basic rights;for although in the primary case it is
persons who are ascribed
basic
rights, equality of opportunity, or
better, fairness, requires us to
ascribe basic rights to human nonpersons as well. ("In Defense of
Speciesisrn," p. 52)

A test of whether sanething is one
of the criteria for judgments of a
certain kind is whether it is conceivable that we might discover
empirically that it is not, or has
ceased to be, evidence in favor of
the truth of such judgments. [5]

But can I get by without personification?
That's what's really at issue.
Sure, by
reading "In Defense of Speciesisrn" and "My
Kind of Person" in the way previously indicated--and that means no more than reading the
relevant portions of each as indicated.
I
don't really think that's so hard.

III

still another objection lodged by pluhar, and one which continues to impress her,
is that my argument is inherently dependent
on a personification of nature.
She notes
that I use all sorts of personifying terms in
my original article (see "speciesisrn Revisited" for a sampling of relevant quotations
fran "In Defense of Speciesisrn") and contends
that I cannot get along without them. So, to
quote myself--for the objection was first
raised by me in "In Defense of Speciesisrn"-isn't my conceptual framework incoherent?
No, I replied, for the personification is
simply a convenient and vivid way of speaking, and one that helps drive my point home.
All personifying terms are extirpable, I
said.
Pluhar disagrees:
they aren't, she
thinks, though originally she didn't say why
and didn't attempt to read or rewrite the
gist of the argument without any personifying
tenus.
Instead, she responds to my remark
that all that needs be done to rennve the
BE'IWEEN THE SPEX::IES

As for why the justice or equality prin-

ciple,
All creatures in the relevant (person-related) class are to be treated fairly and equally in respect to
personhood generated rights ( "My
Kind of Person," p. 27),
srnuld be accepted in the first place, I
don't think that a defense is needed at all-not for that principle, given that everyone
holds that all persons have a right to life.
Saneone like Michael Tooley, [6] for example,
or Joel Feinberg[7] could accept it--would
have to accept it, on pain of not being fair
or just--even though both think that only
persons have a right to life, that the relevant person-related class is that of persons.
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not invoked, only equality as a principle.
But, contends Pluhar in "Speciesism Revisited, that just changes the location of the
circle, for "to suppose, as Wreen does, that
the [equality] principle [stated above] applies to human non-persons is to presuppose
that membership in a species characterized by
personhood has m:>ral weight [I think that she
means "has a right to life" here, though]."
Thus the circle is "not only.
• not broken, it has tightened into a noose for the
argument."

Indeed, anyone who ascribes a right to life
to persons at all has to accept it, despite
the fact that there is great controversy over
whether personhood is the only ground for
ascribing personhood generated rights
or
basic rights.
The m:>re pressing questions I
face really are, "Why is the relevant class
that of humans?" and "Do I defend the view
that it is humans in an inherently metaIJhorical way?"
To answer the second question first:
not at all.
My defense of my view--and that
comprises essentially the whole of "In Defense of Speciesism"--is primarily non-metaphorical, and even in the section in which
metaphorical terms do oc=, non-metaphorical
ones do as well, interspersed am:>ng metar:norical ones, and are used to make precisely the
same points (see "In Defense of Speciesism,
p. 53).[8] As for question one: sufficeit
to say that my view is defended basically on
the grounds (l) that everyone agrees that
personhood is a sufficient condition for the
ascription of a right to life, (2) that personhood is metaphysically caught up with
humanity in the world we have, (3) that empirical conditions of both a general and
particular sort cirewnscribe personhood in
this world, even if not in every possible
one, and (4) that when those conditions are
not met in the case of any particular human
being, it is through no fault of his/her own
( in the great rna. jority of cases) •
If we
assume (if only for the sake of argument)
that, other things being equal, personhood is
the only ground for the ascription of basic
rights, the equality/justice principle would,
in an ideal world, tell us that the "relevant
(person-related) class" is that of persons
alone.
But, as evidenced by (1)-(4) above,
m:>st of "In Defense of Speciesism" is geared
to tell us why the class should not be so
restricted in the world we've got.
There's
nothing metaphorical about that.

Little need be said in reply to this,
given what has been said above.
The principle presupposes no such thing; as it stands,
it is acceptable to--in fact, needs be embraced by--everyone who ascribes basic rights
on the basis of personhood, and it is argued
at length that human beings are one such
person-related class--that is really what the
whole of "In Defense of Speciesism" is an
argument for.

v
In academic circles these days, speciesists like myself are more often shouted down,
stmmarily dismissed, sneered at, entirely
ignored, or called nasty names than paid
attention to and argued with. I thank Evelyn
Pluhar, then, for her critical comnents on
"In Defense of Speciesism" and "My Kind of
Person." The attention itself is gratifying,
and the opportunity to clarify and explain my
position at greater length welcane. [9] I do
think, though, that it is time for Pluhar and
I to call it quits. Five is about as high as
I care to count.

I hope that readers now understand what
it is I have been arguing, and why I think
that speciesism, in the restricted sense of
the terms I've been employing, is justifiable.
Nothing I've said commits me to holding that all, or even most, of what human
beings do to animals is justifiable.
And,
indeed, I think that a large portion of it
isn't.
But I do think that, in the world we
inhabit, the claims that species differences

Circularity
is Pluhar's last charge
against me, just as it was in her earlier
paper.
To her earlier objection that the
argument of "In Defense of Speciesism" was
circular because it assumed that all human
beings have a right to be treated equally, in
an effort to prove that all humans have that
right (along with other basic rights, including the one of interest in the paper, the
right to life), I had responded that there
was no circle because equality as a right was

are m:>rally irrelevant, that species membership is about as m:>rally important a consideration as distance fran Istanbul, that
discrimination between two individuals on the
basis of species membership is akin to discrimination on the basis of race (that is,
racism) or discrimination on the basis of sex
(i.e.,
sexism)--that those and all such
claims of a like sort are radically mistaken.
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In "In Defense of Species ism" and "My Kind of

Self-Identity (Ithaca:
Press, 1962), p. 4.

Person, " I concentrate on one important set
of differences between humans and other animals, a set of differences which binds humanity together but ties us to no animals, and I
argue that the difference is significant
enough, in the mortal realm we're stuck with,
to argue a right to life for all humans,
irrespective of their mental developnent, and
irrespective of the rights, if any, of animals.
But there are many, many more differences than I point out there.
The human
family is marked off from other families by
numerous properties, rrany of them relational
in the strict sense of the term, and even
ClOre relational in a looser sense, the sense
in which the considerations pointed out in

Cornell

University

6. See, for example, any of Tooley's
articles on abortion or his recent book,
Abortion and Infanticide (OXford:
Oxford
University Press, 1983).
7. Joel Feinberg,
"Abortion," in Tom
Regan, ed., Matters of Life and Death (New
York:
Random House, 1980), especially pp.
197-201.
8. As I said in "My Kind of Person, "
the metaphorical tenns are used merely to
bait the hook, argumentatively speaking.
I
was surprised to find Pluhar still nibbling
away in "Speciesism Revisited," even after
having being told that there was nothing on
the end of the line.

"In Defense of Speciesism" are relational. [10] Thus, although I agree with conte.'Tlporary, academic anti-speciesists about many
things and think that humans I treabnent of
. animals is, by and large, deplorable, I can
only urge them to attend to more than the
small number of facts about humans and animals that they do (these chiefly being facts
about the mental life of individual creatures
at a particular time), and to remember that
there are bigger pictures to consider than
creatures in isolation.
Some of them are
IlIUch bigger pictures, involving as they do
the nature of the world and humans' --and
animals'--possibilities for realizing value
in it.
An ethic which takes such matters
into account is a stronger ethic, because a
more realistic one (in the strictest sense of
the term), and an ethic which, practically
speaking, leads to much the same conclusions
as anti-speciesists want to secure anyway.

9. I'd like to thank the editors of
Between the Species for making space available and for allowing me the expression of
views very much opposed to those generally
found in that journal.
10. More on this can be found in my
"Speciesism, Sexism, and Racism," in preparation.
Also relevant is "Au Natural," a paper, in preparation, by Philip Devine and
myself.
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